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 When deciding whether a challenged governmental practice 
violates the Establishment Clause, courts must first ask whether the 
practice has been historically accepted throughout United States 
history.1 If looking to the historical background of the practice cannot 
resolve the question, only then may courts look to other Establishment 
Clause tests set forth by the Supreme Court, such as the endorsement, 
coercion, and purpose tests.2 In Freedom from Religion Foundation, 
Inc. v. Concord Community Schools, the Seventh Circuit skipped this 
                                                 
  J.D. candidate, May 2019, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology. The author would like to thank Professors Steven Heyman, Mary Rose 
Strubbe, Kent Streseman, and Hal Morris for teaching her everything she knows 
about legal writing and for helping her develop a passion for Constitutional Law.  
1 Town of Greece, N.Y. v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014) (stating that “[t]he 
Establishment Clause must be interpreted by reference to historical practices and 
understandings” (internal citations omitted)); see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 
688, 673 (1984) (the Establishment Clause must “comport[] with what history 
reveals was the contemporaneous understanding of its guarantees”); Smith v. 
Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 788 F.3d 580, 589, 604 (2015).  
2 Smith, 788 F.3d at 602-3.  
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first step and did not use the historical approach set forth in Town of 
Greece.3 By sidestepping this recent Supreme Court precedent, the 
Seventh Circuit misapplied important Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence. Because Town of Greece signaled a “sea change in 
constitutional law,”4 in the future, the Seventh Circuit should use the 
historical approach when analyzing whether the Establishment Clause 
is violated. 
 The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment provides that 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.”5 
To interpret this clause, the Supreme Court has “employed at least 
three ways to assess whether a local governmental body, such as a 
school, violates the Establishment Clause: the endorsement, coercion, 
and purpose tests.”6 Establishment Clause jurisprudence is widely 
criticized by Justices, judges, and academics.7 The Lemon test is one 
                                                 
3 885 F.3d 1038 (7th Cir. 2018). 
4 Smith, 788 F.3d at 602 (Batchelder, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the result) (stating that “[w]hen the Supreme Court signals a sea change in 
constitutional law, I do not believe that we can lightly set it aside in a case 
implicating the same constitutional provision…Therefore…Town of Greece should 
inform our analysis here.”). 
5 U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1. 
6 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (stating that “the Constitution 
guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in 
religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which ‘establishes a [state] religion 
or religious faith, or tends to do so.”’ (emphasis added)); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 
U.S. 668, 678 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (“What is crucial is that a 
government practice not have the effect of communicating a message of 
government endorsement or disapproval of religion. It is only practices having that 
effect, whether intentionally or unintentionally, that make religion relevant, in reality 
or public perception, to status in the political community.” (emphasis added)); 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 (1971) (setting forth the purpose test 
and stating that “First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, 
its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; 
finally, the statute must not foster an ‘excessive government entanglement with 
religion.” (emphasis added)).  
 7 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 700 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(declining to apply the Lemon and endorsement tests and stating that “I see no test-
related substitute for the exercise of legal judgment”); id. at 694 (Thomas, J. 
2
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of the most widely used but highly criticized tests.8 Federal circuit 
courts have struggled to consistently apply the Lemon test, and one 
circuit court has recently abandoned the test all together.9 The 
Supreme Court itself departed from its use of the Lemon test in Town 
of Greece v. Galloway.10 In its place, the Court used a historical 
approach along with the coercion test to determine whether the Town 
of Greece could allow volunteer chaplains to open each legislative 
session with a prayer.11  
                                                                                                                   
concurring) (“[T]he incoherence of the Court's decisions in this area renders the 
Establishment Clause impenetrable and incapable of consistent application.”); Cnty. 
of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 669 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing endorsement test “flawed in its fundamentals and unworkable in 
practice”); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(discussing “the type of unprincipled decision making that has plagued our 
Establishment Clause cases since Everson”); Eric Rassbach, Town of Greece v. 
Galloway: The Establishment Clause and the Rediscovery of History, 2014 CATO S. 
CT. REV. 71, 78 (2013-2014) (citing Utah Highway Patrol Ass'n v. Am. Atheists, 
Inc., 132 S.Ct. 12, 12-23 (2011) (mem.) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) 
(collecting cases and criticizing Lemon and endorsement tests)); Jay A. Sekulow & 
Francis J. Manion, The Supreme Court and the Ten Commandments: Compounding 
the Establishment Clause Confusion, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 33, 33 
(2005) (discussing “the fog obscuring . . . Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
generally”). 
 8 Comm. for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 671 
(1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing Tp., 330 
U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (describing the Lemon test as “blurred, indistinct and variable”)); 
William P. Marshall, “We Know It When We See It” The Supreme Court and 
Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 497 (the role of the Lemon test to resolve any 
establishment inquiry “is ambiguous. At times the Court has described the test as a 
helpful signpost, at other times the Court has suggested that it can be discarded in 
certain circumstances, at still other times the Court has held that it must be 
rigorously applied.”).  
 9 New Doe Child #1 v. U.S., 901 F.3d 1015 (8th Cir. 2018). 
10 See generally Town of Greece N.Y. v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014); 
Karthik Ravishankar, The Establishment Clause’s Hydra: The Lemon Test in the 
Circuit Courts, 41 U. DAYTON L. REV. 261, 266 (2016) (explaining that “in Town of 
Greece v. Galloway, a divided Court affirmed another town’s legislative prayer 
practice without invoking Lemon, again applying the reasoning from Marsh by 
analyzing the setting of the prayer and its intended audience.”).  
11 Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 575-576.  
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 In Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Concord 
Community Schools, the Seventh Circuit did not explicitly use the 
historical approach set forth in Town of Greece, the Supreme Court’s 
most recent Establishment Clause case.12 Chief Judge Wood wrote the 
majority opinion and used three other Establishment Clause tests to 
find there was no Establishment Clause violation.13 The Court 
concluded under all three tests that a holiday program at issue was not 
impermissibly coercive, did not have an unlawful religious purpose, 
and a reasonable observer would not have viewed the program as a 
religious endorsement.14 However, not all the judges on the Seventh 
Circuit agreed with which Establishment Clause test or tests should be 
applied. In Concord, Judge Frank Easterbrook concurred in the 
judgment, but disagreed with the use and application of coercion test.15  
 The Supreme Court has given inconsistent guidance and has not 
explicitly overruled any Establishment Clause tests. The Seventh 
Circuit’s decision in Concord highlights the confusion among courts 
the Establishment Clause has created. The Eighth Circuit recently 
broke free from the Lemon test, becoming the first court of appeals to 
use the Supreme Court’s historical approach set forth in Town of 
Greece v. Galloway.16 Now that the Eighth Circuit has left the Lemon 
test behind, a shift in the federal courts Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence may occur. As the Eighth Circuit noted, Town of Greece 
is a “major doctrinal shift in Establishment Clause jurisprudence.”17 
While the Supreme Court has developed multiple tests for analyzing 
the Establishment Clause, it has never adopted one clear test.18 
Whether the circuit courts will continue to use the coercion, purpose, 
                                                 
12 885 F.3d 1038, 1045-46 (7th Cir. 2018). 
13 Id.  
14 Id. at 1053.  
15 Id. at 1038. 
 16 New Doe Child #1 v. United States, 901 F.3d 1015 (8th Cir. 2018). 
17 Id. at 1028 (internal quotations omitted).  
18 See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 869 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(explaining that “[i]n all the years of its effort, the Court has isolated no single test of 
constitutional sufficiency”). 
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and endorsement tests, or resort to the reasoning of the Supreme Court 
in Town of Greece, is uncertain. However, until the Supreme Court 
clearly defines Establishment Clause jurisprudence by mandating one 
specific test, it is unlikely the Seventh Circuit will completely abandon 
any of the three older tests. 
 This note argues that federal circuit courts must follow the 
Supreme Court’s most recent guidance in Town of Greece. Courts 
must look to historical meaning, when applicable, to determine 
whether a challenged governmental action violates the Establishment 
Clause. Only then can courts look to other Establishment Clause tests, 
such as the endorsement, purpose, and coercion tests. This note will 
first explain the history of Establishment Clause jurisprudence and the 
various tests the Supreme Court has set forth. Second, this note will 
survey the different circuit court approaches to the Establishment 
Clause tests, in particular the Seventh Circuit and Eighth Circuit. Last, 
this note will analyze the benefits of using the historical method and 
suggest that courts should look to history, coupled with another 
Establishment Clause test if necessary, to evaluate whether a 
constitutional violation has occurred. 
 
A. The History of the Establishment Clause 
 
1. Early Establishment Clause History 
 
 When looking at a challenged governmental practice, the Supreme 
Court’s early Establishment Clause jurisprudence analyzed the history 
of disputed practices to determine whether a constitutional violation 
had occurred.19 In Everson v. Board of Education, the majority stated 
that the Establishment Clause should be interpreted in “light of its 
history.”20 Even the dissent agreed with this approach, commenting 
that “[n]o provision of the Constitution is more closely tied to or given 
content by its generating history than the religious clause of the First 
                                                 
 19 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1947) 
(discussing the importance of the separation between church and state).  
20 Id. at 14-15.  
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Amendment.”21 For the following two decades, the Supreme Court 
based its Establishment Clause findings on historical practices and 
understandings.22   
For example, in 1961, the Supreme Court considered whether a 
Maryland criminal statute which proscribed labor, business, and other 
commercial activities on Sundays violated the Establishment Clause.23 
Appellants argued that “Sunday is the Sabbath day of the predominant 
Christian sects [and] the purpose of the enforced stoppage of labor on 
that day is to facilitate and encourage church attendance.”24 In its 
analysis, the Supreme Court stated that the history of Sunday Closing 
Laws in the United States was relevant to whether the statutes respect 
an establishment of religion.25 The Court looked as far back as 
colonial and English legislation, and observed that “English Sunday 
legislation was in aid of the established church.”26 However, the Court 
acknowledged that in recent times, there were “secular justifications 
[that] have been advanced for making Sunday a day of rest.”27 The 
Court held that the Sunday Closing Laws did not violate the 
Establishment Clause because “most of them, at least, are of a secular 
rather than of a religious character, and that presently they bear no 
                                                 
21 Id. at 33. (Rutledge, J., dissenting).  
 22 Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 680 (1970) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (explaining that “the history, purpose, and operation of real 
property tax exemptions for religious organizations must be examined to 
determine whether the Establishment Clause is breached by such 
exemptions.”) (citing School Dist. of Abington Tp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 
U.S. 203, 293 (1963)); McGowan v. State of Md., 366 U.S. 420, 431 (1961) 
(explaining that an “inquiry into the history of Sunday Closing Laws in our 
country, in addition to an examination of the Maryland Sunday closing 
statutes in their entirety and of their history, is relevant to the decision of 
whether the Maryland Sunday law in question is one respecting an 
establishment of religion”). 
23 Id. at 422.  
24 Id. at 431.  
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 432-33.  
27 Id. at 434.  
6
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 4
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol14/iss1/4




relationship to establishment of religion as those words are used in the 
Constitution of the United States.”28  
In 1963, the Court in Abington School District v. Schempp stated 
that the line between “the permissible and impermissible is one which 
accords with history and faithfully reflects the understanding of the 
Founding Fathers.”29 In Abington, two state statutes providing for 
Bible reading in public schools were held unconstitutional under the 
Establishment Clause.30 Seven years later, the Supreme Court 
analyzed the Establishment Clause under a historical approach again 
in Walz v. Tax Commission of City of New York.31 The issue in Walz 
was whether property tax exemptions to religious organizations for 
property used for religious worship violated the Establishment 
Clause.32 Finding that there was “no genuine nexus between tax 
exemption and establishment of religion,” the Court looked to an 
earlier case, which stated that “a page of history is worth a volume of 
logic.”33 The Court examined the governmental purpose for granting 
tax exemptions to religious institutions, and found that there was no 
strong case for finding this “historic practice” unconstitutional.34 As 
evidenced by McGowan and Abington, the Supreme Court’s mid to 
late twentieth century approach to the Establishment Clause was 
historical. 
 
                                                 
28 Id. at 444.  
29 374 U.S. 203, 294 (1963).  
30 Id. at 223. 
31 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
32 Id. at 666-68.  
 33 Id. at 675-76. (citing New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 
(1921) (Holmes, J.)).  
34 Id. at 686-87.  
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2. The Lemon Test 
 
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Supreme Court broke from its 
traditional, historical approach and created a new Establishment 
Clause test.35 In Lemon, the issue was whether two statutes that 
provided state funding for non-public, religious schools violated the 
Establishment Clause.36 A Rhode Island Program allowed the state to 
provide a fifteen percent salary supplement to teachers who taught 
secular subjects at religious schools.37 The Pennsylvania statute had a 
similar reimbursement and also provided partial reimbursement for 
secular materials in the religious schools.38 In an 8-1 decision, the 
Court found the two Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes at issue 
were unconstitutional.39  
Striking down both statutes, the Court looked to its previous 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence in Board of Education v. Allen 
and Walz v. Tax Commission to develop the three prongs now known 
as the Lemon test.40 The Lemon test asks whether the government’s 
action (1) has a religious “purpose,” (2) has the “primary effect” of 
“advancing” or “endorsing” religion; and (3) fosters “excessive 
government entanglement with religion.”41 In Lemon, the Court 
focused its analysis on the third prong, finding that the “cumulative 
                                                 
35 403 U.S. 602 (1971).  
36 Id. at 606 (finding both statutes “unconstitutional under the Religion Clauses 
of the First Amendment, as the cumulative impact of the entire relationship arising 
under the statutes involves excessive entanglement between government and 
religion”). 
37 Id. at 607. 
38 Id.  
39 Id. at 603.  
 40 Id. at 612-613 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 668 
(1970) and Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)).  
 41 Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 
384, 395 (1993) (explaining the Lemon test); see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 
U.S. 602, 612-613 (1971).  
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impact of the entire relationship arising under the statutes in each State 
involves excessive entanglement between government and religion.”42   
The Lemon test has been highly criticized for its malleability and 
self-contradiction by courts and commentators.43 Many Supreme Court 
Justices, past and present, are stark critics of the test.44 One of the 
Lemon tests biggest critics was Justice Scalia. In his concurrence in 
Lamb’s Chapel, Justice Scalia explained that “no fewer than five of 
the currently sitting Justices have, in their own opinions, personally 
driven pencils through the creature’s heart [the Lemon test], and a 
sixth has joined an opinion doing so.”45 Justice Scalia refused to join 
                                                 
42 See id. at 613-614. 
43 See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 398 (Scalia, J.) (“As to the Court’s 
invocation of the Lemon test: Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that 
repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and 
buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause Jurisprudence once again.”); Doe v. 
Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 869-77 (7th Cir. 2012) (Easterbrook, J. & 
Posner, J., dissenting from en banc decision) (stating that Lemon and the “no 
endorsement” test are “hopelessly open-ended”); Jesse H. Choper, The 
Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools—An Update, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 
5 (1987). 
44 See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 644 (1992) (Scalia, J. and Thomas, 
J., dissenting); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655-57 (1989) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Corp. of Presiding Bishop of 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 346-349 
(1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107-
13 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  
45 508 U.S. at 398-99 (citing Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 644 (1992) 
(Scalia, J., joined by, inter alios, Thomas, J., dissenting); Allegheny County v. 
American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 655–657 
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in 
part); Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints 
v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 346–349 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring in 
judgment); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107–113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting); id., at 90–91, 105 S.Ct. at 2507 (White, J., dissenting); School Dist. of 
Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 400 (1985) (White, J., dissenting); Widmar v. 
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 282 (1981) (White, J., dissenting); New York v. Cathedral 
Academy, 434 U.S. 125, 134–135 (1977) (White, J., dissenting); Roemer v. Board of 
Pub. Works of Md., 426 U.S. 736, 768 (1976) (White, J., concurring in 
9
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the majority opinion in Lamb’s Chapel because of the use of the 
Lemon test. While the Lemon test might first appear to be a simple 
three-part test, the problem is that the Court itself is wishy washy 
about how much deference it should be given. For example, in Hunt v. 
McNair, the Court stated that the three-part test was “no more than 
helpful signposts.”46 While the Lemon test was once the leading 
method for challenges to the Establishment Clause, the test has caused 
greater division than unity. Until five Justices of the Supreme Court 
specifically abrogate the rule, the circuit courts will continue to use the 
test.47  
 
3. Revisiting the Historical Approach:  
Marsh and Town of Greece  
 
 In Marsh v. Chambers and Town of Greece v. Galloway, the 
Supreme Court returned to looking to history and traditional 
understandings of challenged governmental practices in analyzing 
whether legislative prayer violated the Establishment Clause.48 The 
question in Marsh was whether the Nebraska Legislature’s practice of 
opening each session with a prayer led by a chaplain, who was paid by 
the state, violated the Establishment Clause.49 Writing for the majority, 
Justice Berger held the Nebraska Legislature’s practice did not violate 
the Establishment Clause.50 Instead of using the Lemon test, Justice 
Burger relied on history and the intent of the Framers of the United 
                                                                                                                   
judgment); Committee for Public Ed. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 
820 (1973) (White, J., dissenting). 
46 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973).  
 47 Eric Rassbach, Town of Greece v. Galloway: The Establishment Clause and 
the Rediscovery of History, 2014 CATO S. CT. REV. 71, 78 (2013-2014).  
 48 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding the Nebraska 
legislature’s practice of offering opening prayers); Town of Greece, N.Y. v. 
Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014) (finding there was insufficient evidence that the 
town had “intentionally excluded non-Christians from giving prayers at Town Board 
meetings.”). 
 49 Id. at 784.  
50 Id. at 787.   
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States Constitution. Looking to the “unambiguous and unbroken 
history of more than 200 years,” he stated that “the practice of opening 
legislative sessions with prayer has become part of the fabric of our 
society.”51 
 In 2014, the Supreme Court in Town of Greece, N.Y. v. Galloway 
again moved away from Lemon’s ahistorical analysis of the 
Establishment Clause.52 Breaking free from the Lemon test, the Court 
engaged in a historical analysis of legislative prayer, which dated back 
to the time the Framers drafted the First Amendment.53 Citizens in 
Greece, New York held town board meetings where a local clergyman 
would give an invocation.54 A town employee would call local 
religious institutions until she found a minister available for the 
monthly meeting.55 The town did not exclude or deny any prospective 
prayer-givers the opportunity, allowing ministers, laypersons, or even 
atheists to give the invocation.56 However, all prayer-givers were 
Christian.57 Two women, Susan Galloway and Linda Stephens, sued 
the town, saying that the prayer practice preferred Christian prayer 
over other religious and sponsored sectarian prayers.58   
 The question was whether the practice of opening town board 
meetings with a prayer violated the Establishment Clause.59 The 
Supreme Court looked to the history of legislative prayer and 
recognized that “while religious in nature, [legislative prayer] has long 
been understood as compatible with the Establishment Clause.”60 The 
                                                 
51 Id. at 792.  
 52 572 U.S. 565 (2014) (abrogating Alleghany v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh 
Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).  
 53 Id.   
 54 Id. at 570.  
55 Id.  
56 Id.  
57 Id.  
58 Id. at 572-3.  
59 Id. at 570.  
60 Id. at 576; see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (O’Connor, 
J., concurring).  
11
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appropriate test to be used, the Court said, “must acknowledge a 
practice that was accepted by the Framers and has withstood the 
critical scrutiny of time and political change.”61 Justice Kennedy also 
used the coercion test and evaluated whether a reasonable observer 
would think the prayers had a coercive tone or message.62 He 
recognized that “the reasonable observer is acquainted with this 
tradition and understand that its purposes are to lend gravity to public 
proceedings and to acknowledge the place religion holds in the lives of 
many private citizens, not to afford government an opportunity to 
proselytize or force truant constituents into the pews.”63 
In making its decision, the Court stated that “there can be no 
doubt that the practice of opening legislative sessions with a prayer 
has become part of the fabric of our society.”64 The Court stated “that 
the Establishment Clause must be interpreted by reference to historical 
practices and understandings.”65 Essentially, under Town of Greece, 
any test under the Establishment Clause must look to history.66 In his 
concurrence, Justice Alito further explained that the practice of 
delivering a prayer at the beginning of each legislative session “was 
well established and undoubtedly well known.”67 Any inconsistency 
between Establishment Clause tests and the historic practice of 
legislative prayer, “calls into question the validity of the test, not the 
historic practice.”68 
Ultimately, the Court decided that opening a town meeting with a 
prayer comported with tradition and was not coercive.69 Notably, the 
                                                 
61 Town of Greece, N.Y. v. Galloway, 472 U.S. 572, 577 (2014) (emphasis 
added).  
 62 Id. at 586-87. (citing County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659 
(1989)) (Kennedy, J., dissenting in part).  
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in 
part) (citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983)).  
 65 Id. at 565. (emphasis added). 
66 Id.  
67 Id. at 603.  
68 Id.  
69 Id. at 591-92.  
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Court did not analyze the case using the Lemon test. Justice Breyer’s 
dissent was the only part of the case to cite Lemon.70 In doing so, the 
Court did not explicitly overrule the Lemon test or any other 
Establishment Clause test.  
Town of Greece created a two-pronged test. First, “[t]he 
Establishment Clause must be interpreted by reference to historical 
practices and understandings . . . Any test the Court adopts must 
acknowledge a practice that was accepted by the Framers and has 
withstood the critical scrutiny of time and change.”71 Second, “[i]t is 
an elemental First Amendment principle that government may not 
coerce its citizens to support or participate in any religion or its 
exercise.”72 
 
4. The Endorsement Test 
 
Justice O’Connor first proposed the Endorsement Test in her 
concurring opinion in County of Allegheny v. ACLU and was approved 
by a majority of the Court five years later in Lynch v. Donnelly.73 
Justice O’Connor acknowledged that it is unclear “how the three parts 
of the [Lemon] test relate to the principles enshrined in the 
Establishment Clause.”74 Recognizing this, Justice O’Connor set forth 
a method to analyze the Establishment Clause – the Endorsement Test 
                                                 
70 Id. at 614-15 (Breyer, S., dissenting) (citing to Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 
602, 622 (1971) and stating that “[t]he question in this case is whether the prayer 
practice of the town of Greece, by doing too little to reflect the religious diversity of 
its citizens, did too much, even if unintentionally, to promote the “political division 
along religious lines” that “was one of the principal evils against which the First 
Amendment was intended to protect.”).   
71 Id. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part) (internal citations omitted).  
72 Id. at 586 (plurality opinion).  
 73 Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 
(1989), abrogated on other grounds by Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S.Ct. 1811 
(2014) (holding a State’s practice of employing a legislative chaplain was 
permissible); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(upholding a city’s holiday display of a crèche). 
74 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 689.  
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– which asks whether “a government practice is perceived as an 
endorsement of religion.”75 Said a different way, the question is 
whether “the challenged governmental practice has . . . the purpose or 
effect of ‘endorsing’ religion.”76 
 In County of Allegheny, the majority found that the display of a 
menorah and a Christmas tree on public property was not an 
impermissible governmental endorsement of Christianity and 
Judaism.77 While the government “may celebrate Christmas in some 
manner and form,” it may not endorse the Christian religion.78 While 
the endorsement test has been used and accepted, like the Lemon test, 
the endorsement test has not been without criticism.79  The Court in 
Town of Greece did not use the endorsement test, but at the same time 
did not abrogate endorsement test.80 Therefore, circuit courts continue 
to apply the endorsement test.81 
 
                                                 
75 Id. at 689.  
 76 Cty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592 (citing Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 436 
(1962)); see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 (1985) (using the endorsement 
test to find a moment-of-silence statute was an endorsement of prayer activities).  
77 Cty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 574.  
78 Id. 601-602.  
 79 Id. at 574 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (discussing the endorsement test and 
stating that “[t]his Court's decisions, however, impose no such burden on 
demonstrating that the government has favored a particular sect or creed, but, to the 
contrary, have required strict scrutiny of practices suggesting a denominational 
preference”). 
80 Smith v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 788 F.3d 580, 589 (6th Cir. 
2015).  
81 Id. (explaining that “Town of Greece gives no indication that the court 
intended to completely displace the endorsement test. The opinion does not address 
the general validity of the endorsement test at all; it simply explains why a historical 
view was more appropriate in the case at hand. We therefore apply the endorsement 
analysis here.”); see also Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Concord 
Community Schools, 885 F.3d 1038, n.1 (7th Cir. 2018) (“Indeed, there is debate 
among the Justices about the continuing validity of the endorsement test . . . at least 
the dissenting Justices in Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 
S.Ct. 2012 n.4 (2017), suggested that the endorsement test is still with us.” (internal 
citations omitted)).  
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5. The Coercion Test 
 
Justice Kennedy formulated what is now known as the coercion 
test.82 In Lee, public high schools and middle schools invited clergy to 
give invocations and benedictions at graduation ceremonies.83 Writing 
for the majority, Justice Kennedy found that the prayers conducted at 
the graduations violated the Establishment Clause because they 
effectively coerced students to support or participate in religion.84  
The Court recognized that in elementary and secondary schools, 
prayer exercises “carry a particular risk of indirect coercion.”85 
Focusing on the indirect and peer pressure put on students to stand as a 
group or be silent during the ceremony, the Court stated that “[i]t is 
beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that 
government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in 
religion or its exercise.”86  
In his dissent, Justice Scalia criticized the coercion test.87 He 
stated that “[t]he coercion that was a hallmark of historical 
establishments of religion was coercion of religious orthodoxy and of 
financial support by force of law and threat of penalty.”88 He gave an 
example of the Colony of Virginia, where the Church of England 
forced ministers to deliver the doctrine and rites of the Church and all 
persons were required to go to church and observe the Sabbath.89 
Justice Scalia did not disagree with the general idea that the 
government cannot coerce anyone to participate in religion, but he 
stated that the concept of coercion must be coupled with a “threat of 
                                                 
82 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
83 Id.  
84 Id. at 577-78.  
85 Id. at 592. (citing Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)); School Dist. 
Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
86 Lee, 505 U.S. at 587.  
87 Id. at 640-41. 
88 Id. 640. (emphasis in original).  
89 Id. 641.  
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penalty.”90 There was no specific threat of penalty at issue in Lee, 
according to Justice Scalia.91 While the coercion test is not without its 
critics, the Court’s use of the test in Town of Greece indicates that the 
coercion test is still well and alive in the Court.92  
 
B. Varying Circuit Court Applications of Establishment Clause Tests  
 
What makes Establishment Clause jurisprudence different from 
other constitutional issues is the open criticism of the area of law by 
Supreme Court Justices and the courts of appeals.93 Because the 
                                                 
 90 Id. at 642. (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (citing American Jewish Congress v. 
Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 132 (7th Cir. 1987)).  
91 Id. 
92 572 U.S. 565, 584-87 (2014) (“The town of Greece does not violate the First 
Amendment by opening its meetings with prayer that comports with our tradition 
and does not coerce participation by nonadherents.” (emphasis added)).  
 93 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 700 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(declining to apply the Lemon and endorsement tests and stating that “I see no test-
related substitute for the exercise of legal judgment”); id. at 694 (Thomas, J. 
concurring) (“[T]he incoherence of the Court's decisions in this area renders the 
Establishment Clause impenetrable and incapable of consistent application.”); 
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 768 n.3 
(1995) (plurality opinion, Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Kennedy and 
Thomas, JJ.) (“[The endorsement test] supplies no standard whatsoever . . . It is 
irresponsible to make the Nation's legislators walk this minefield.”); Cnty. of 
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 669 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (criticizing 
endorsement test “flawed in its fundamentals and unworkable in practice”); Wallace 
v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (discussing “the type 
of unprincipled decision making that has plagued our Establishment Clause cases 
since Everson”); Eric Rassbach, Town of Greece v. Galloway: The Establishment 
Clause and the Rediscovery of History, 2014 CATO S. CT. REV. 71, 81-82 (2013-
2014) (citing Utah Highway Patrol Ass'n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S.Ct. 12, 12-23 
(2011) (mem.) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) (collecting cases and 
criticizing Lemon and endorsement tests); Jay A. Sekulow & Francis J. Manion, The 
Supreme Court and the Ten Commandments: Compounding the Establishment 
Clause Confusion, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 33, 33 (2005) (discussing “the fog 
obscuring . . . Establishment Clause jurisprudence generally”); Douglas G. 
Smith, The Establishment Clause: Corollary of Eighteenth-Century Corporate 
Law?, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 239, 294 (2003) (explaining that the Court's Establishment 
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Supreme Court has set forth so many different tests, lower courts are 
tasked with sifting through the weeds of Supreme Court decisions to 
figure out which test to use. The Seventh Circuit in Concord applied 
three prominent tests, the purpose (Lemon test), endorsement, and 
coercion tests, to determine whether an Establishment Clause violation 
occurred.94 But, the court failed to follow the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Town of Greece, which says that courts must apply a 
historical analysis in deciding Establishment Clause cases.95 On the 
other hand, the Eighth Circuit in New Doe Child #1 v. U.S. declined to 
use the Lemon test entirely and opted for the Town of Greece historical 
approach.96 With the Seventh Circuit departing from recent Supreme 
Court precedent, and the Eighth Circuit leaving many of the old tests 
behind, Establishment Clause jurisprudence is more unclear than ever.  
 
 
1. The Seventh Circuit’s Approach 
 
The most significant problem with the modern state of the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Establishment Clause is how it 
leaves lower courts to decide which test to use.97 Because of the wide 
variety of applicable tests, different results are reached using different 
tests. The Seventh Circuit has not been immune from this problem. 
Judges on the Seventh Circuit have recognized this juggling act – with 
multiple tests, comes multiple choices and outcomes.  
                                                                                                                   
Clause jurisprudence is “confused”); William P. Marshall, “We Know It When We 
See It” The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 495 
(1986) (“From the outset it has been painfully clear that logical consistency and 
establishment clause jurisprudence were to have little in common.”). 
94 Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Concord Community Schools, 
885 F.3d 1038 (7th Cir. 2018). 
95 Town of Greece, N.Y. v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 577 (2014).  
96 New Doe Child #1 v. U.S., 901 F.3d 1015 (8th Cir. 2018).  
97 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 857 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(noting how “there remains the question of which of the two irreconcilable strands of 
our Establishment Clause jurisprudence we should now follow.”). 
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As the Seventh Circuit noted in Freedom from Religion 
Foundation, Inc. v. Concord Community Schools, Supreme Court 
Justices have also been critical of Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence.98 In Concord, Chief Judge Wood analyzed whether the 
Establishment Clause was violated under all three of the Supreme 
Court’s approaches: the endorsement, coercion, and purpose tests.99  
The issue in Concord was whether a public high school’s holiday 
show violated the Establishment Clause.100 Through the Freedom 
From Religion Foundation, Inc., a high school student and his father 
brought a suit against a public school corporation.101 Concord High 
School’s “Christmas Spectacular,” was a holiday show that had “a 
particular focus on Christmas.”102 There were two parts to the show.103 
The first half varied from year to year, but showcased non-religious 
songs and dances, which were tied to an annual theme.104 The second 
half, the section which was disputed, involved a 20-minute section 
called “The Story of Christmas.”105 In this segment, there were 
“religious songs interspersed with a narrator reading passages from the 
New Testament.”106 At the end of the act, students posed in a nativity 
scene.107  
                                                 
 98 Concord, 885 F.3d at 1045 (citing Elmbrook Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 134 
S. Ct. 2283 (2014) and noting that in their dissents, Justices Scalia and 
Thomas expressed the view that the Supreme Court has rejected the 
endorsement test) (citing Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. 
Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2031 n.4 (2017) and stating that the dissenting 
Justices in Trinity suggested that the endorsement test is still relevant).  
99 Concord, 885 F.3d at 1045.  
100 Id.   
101 Id. at 1041-42.  
102 Id. at 1041.  
103 Id.  
104 Id.  
105 Id.  
106 Id.  
107 Id. at 1042.  
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Because they took issue with the second half of the show, 
Plaintiffs brought suit against the school, asking for declaratory and 
injunctive relief.108 Plaintiffs also asked for a preliminary injunction to 
prevent the school from showcasing the second half of the 2014 show 
in the upcoming December 2015 show.109 In response, Concord 
offered to make two changes to the proposed version of the 2015 
show: it would remove the scriptural reading from the nativity scene, 
and add two songs, “Ani Ma’amin” and “Harambee,” to represent 
Hanukkah and Kwanzaa.110 The district court judge held that these 
changes were not enough to “address the Establishment Clause 
problems,” and granted the preliminary injunction.111 After, Concord 
adopted further changes to the show.112 They added Hanukkah and 
Kwanzaa songs, showed a two minute nativity scene with mannequins 
as opposed to students, and cut out the New Testament readings.113 
Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the district court held 
that the 2015 show did not violate the Establishment Clause, granting 
partial summary judgment in favor of Concord.114   
On appeal, Plaintiffs argued that even with the changes to the 
second half of the Christmas Spectacular, the show still violated the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.115 The Court walked 
through each of the three Supreme Court’s tests to determine whether 
there had been a violation of the Establishment Clause.116 The Court 
analyzed the Christmas Spectacular under the endorsement, coercion, 
and purpose tests.117 Ultimately, the Court found that under any of the 
                                                 
108 Id.  
109 Id.  
110 Id.  
111 Id. 
112 Id.  
113 Id. at 1044.  
114 Id. at 1045.  
115 Id.  
116 Id. at 1045-46.  
117 Id. 
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tests, Concord’s 2015 show did not violate the Establishment 
Clause.118  
When analyzing the Christmas Spectacular under the “purpose” 
test, the Seventh Circuit looked to the test’s root: Lemon v. 
Kurtzman.119 Interestingly, the Seventh Circuit did not explicitly call 
its method the Lemon test, but it did reference the case.120 Under the 
Seventh Circuit’s purpose test, the “practice is unconstitutional if it 
lacks a secular objective.”121 Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit 
concluded that the primary purposes of the holiday program were 
entertainment and pedagogy, not religion.122  
 Concurring in the judgment, Judge Easterbrook stated that while 
he agreed the performance should be upheld, the court should have 
done so on other grounds.123 He explained that “as a matter of history 
or constitutional text” a government does not establish “a religion 
through an artistic performance that favorably depicts one or more 
aspects of that religion’s theology or iconography.”124 Judge 
Easterbrook further stated that “as both Lemon and the no-
endorsement approach are judicial creations rather than restatements 
of the first amendment's meaning, they do not justify a claim by judges 
to have the final word. I have made this point elsewhere, so I do not 
present an extended argument here.”125   
In Concord, the Seventh Circuit indicated in a few different ways 
that it was refusing to use the Town of Greece historical test. First, 
under the purpose test, the test does not require the court to “evaluate 
                                                 
118 Id. at 1053.  
119 Id. at 1049.  
120 Id.  
121 Id.  
122 Id. at 1050. 
123 Id. at 1053. 
124 Id. 
 125 Id. (citing Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 869 (7th 
Cir. 2012)). 
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the quality or sufficiency of the historical analysis at issue.”126 The 
Court in Town of Greece mandated that courts use a historical analysis 
to determine whether the challenged practice violated the 
Establishment Clause.127 In defiance of sorts, Concord explicitly stated 
that the purpose test is unrelated to challenged historical practices. 
Second, and more importantly, the Concord court did not apply the 
Town of Greece historical approach as one of its three methods in 
analyzing an Establishment Clause challenge. Third, while using the 
endorsement test, the Seventh Circuit did mention that a “reasonable 
observer is aware of a situation’s history and context.”128 However, 
merely mentioning that a practice’s history should be considered is not 
enough to satisfy Town of Greece. Courts must actually engage in a 
historical analysis according to Town of Greece.  
In sum, the court in Concord disagreed about the validity of the 
Lemon test and failed to use the most recently proposed Supreme 
Court test set forth in Town of Greece at all. This indicates that there is 
disagreement on the use of Supreme Court Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence and reluctance to use the historical approach. Because of 
the hodgepodge of Establishment Clause tests and questionability of 
which tests are “live,” Judge Wood used the endorsement, purpose, 
and coercion tests in her analysis. However, the court failed to cover 
all the bases when it did not use the historical approach set forth in 
Town of Greece. 
 
2. The Eighth Circuit’s Approach 
 
 In New Doe Child #1 v. U.S., the Eighth Circuit became the first 
circuit court to decline to use the Lemon test entirely.129 In New Doe, 
                                                 
 126 Id. (citing Books v. Elkhart Cty., Ind., 401 F.3d 857, 866 (7th Cir. 2005)) 
(explaining that “[t]he purpose prong of the Lemon test does not require us to 
evaluate the quality or sufficiency of the historical analysis embodied in the County's 
display.”).  
127 Town of Greece, N.Y. v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 572 (2014). 
128 Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Concord Community Schools, 
885 F.3d 1038, 1046 (7th Cir. 2018). 
129 901 F.3d 1015 (8th Cir. 2018). 
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the Court recognized that this was the first time the circuit had 
analyzed an Establishment Clause issue since “the guidance of new 
Supreme Court precedent” in Town of Greece.130 The Eighth Circuit 
acknowledged that the Supreme Court had set forth numerous 
Establishment Clause tests, but had failed to commit to any specific 
one.131  
 The issue in New Doe Child #1 was whether placing the national 
motto on money violated the Establishment Clause.132 Looking to the 
Supreme Court’s most recent Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the 
Eighth Circuit noted Town of Greece’s “unequivocal directive: ‘[T]he 
Establishment Clause must be interpreted by reference to historical 
practices and understandings.”133 In deciding which test to use, the 
New Doe Child #1 court acknowledged the major doctrinal shift since 
Town of Greece.134 The court stated that “[g]iven (1) Galloway’s 
unqualified directive that the Establishment Clause “must” be 
interpreted according to historical practices and understandings, (2) its 
emphasis that this historical approach is not limited to a particular 
factual context; and (3) the absence of any reference to other tests in 
the Court’s opinion, we agree” that there has been a “major doctrinal 
shift in Establishment Clause jurisprudence.”135  
 In using Town of Greece’s historical approach, the Eighth Circuit 
asked two questions. First, what do the historical practices at hand 
“indicate about the constitutionality of placing the national motto on 
money?”136 And second, is the placement of the national motto on 
                                                 
130 Id. at 1019 (citing Town of Greece, N.Y. v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014).  
 131 Id. (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678-79 (1984) and Van Orden 
v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring)).  
132 Id. at 1018-19.   
133 Id. at 1020 (citing Town of Greece, N.Y., v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 566 
(2014).  
134 Id. (citing Felix v. City of Bloomfield, 847 F.3d 1214, 1219 (10th Cir. 
2017) (Kelly, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) and Smith v. 
Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 788 F.3d 580, 602 (6th Cir. 2015) (Batchelder, 
J., concurring in part and concurring in the result)).  
135 Id. (internal citations omitted).  
136 Id. at 1021.  
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money impermissibly coercive?137 The court looked to the history of 
placing “In God We Trust” on U.S. money, which began in 1864.138 
The court noted that the history of this practice was “unbroken” and 
that the government is not required to purge itself “of all religious 
reflection.”139 Ultimately, the court found that putting “In God We 
Trust” on U.S. coins comported with historical practices.140 
 The court also supplemented it’s historical analysis by using the 
coercion test.141 But, the court stated that it was unnecessary to “probe 
the bounds of the coercion analysis in this case because it is even more 
apparent than in Galloway that the Government does not compel 
citizens to engage in a religious observance when it places the national 
motto on money.”142 The Eighth Circuit further clarified that historical 
analysis is not the only test, but one of the most important ones: “In 
other words, even when history indicates that a practice does not 
offend the Establishment Clause, but the Court’s other Establishment 
Clause tests suggest that it does, history alone cannot carry the day . . . 
[and] history is now the single most important criterion when 
evaluating Establishment Clause claims.”143  
 
C. The Future of the Historical Approach 
 
Town of Greece set forth a new approach to the Establishment 
Clause: first analyze the practice under history, and if that still leaves 
the constitutionality of the practice unresolved, then turn to the other 
tests, most preferably the coercion test. Despite this guidance, 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence continues to be a mishmosh of 
                                                 
137 Id.  
138 Id.  
139 Id. at 1022. (citing ACLU Neb. Found. v. City of Plattsmouth, 419 F.3d 
772, 778 (8th Cir. 2005).  
140 Id. at 1023. 
 141 Id. (questioning “whether the appearance of ‘In God We Trust’ on U.S. 
money is coercive.”).  
142 Id. (citing Mayle v. U.S., 891 F.3d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 2018)). 
143 Id. at 1028 (Kelly, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).  
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tests. While some courts still use the Lemon test, its continuing 
applicability is questionable. As Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh 
Circuit noted, the Lemon test was “made up by the Justices during 
recent decades.”144 The Eighth Circuit left behind the Lemon test in 
favor of the historical approach and the coercion test. On the other 
hand, the Seventh Circuit continues to use the Lemon test and fails to 
use the historical approach. This begs the question, what is the future 
of Establishment Clause jurisprudence and in particular, the historical 
approach?  
In Concord, Judge Wood used a variety of Establishment Clause 
tests.145 Using three tests, the court arrived at one conclusion: the 
holiday show did not violate the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment. To sufficiently expound the point that the holiday show 
did not violate the Establishment Clause, it was a smart tactic to 
employ multiple tests. Judge Wood recognized that there is 
considerable disagreement about which test to employ, even among 
the Supreme Court Justices.146 Using three tests was an attempt to 
leave no doubt that no Establishment Clause violation had taken place. 
However, the court in Concord did leave one puzzle piece 
unsolved. Although Town of Greece marked a “major inflection point” 
in Establishment Clause jurisprudence,147 the Seventh Circuit failed to 
                                                 
 144 Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook School Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 869 (Easterbrook, 
J., dissenting) (noting that the Lemon test is open-ended, lacks support in the text of 
the First Amendment, and has no historical derivation); see also Card v. City of 
Everett, 520 F.3d 1009, 1023-24 (9th Cir. 2008) (Fernandez, J., concurring) (“The 
still stalking Lemon test and the other tests and factors, which have floated to the top 
of this chaotic ocean from time to time in order to answer specific questions, are so 
indefinite and unhelpful that Establishment Clause jurisprudence has not been more 
fathomable.”).  
 145 Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Concord Community Schools, 
885 F.3d 1038, 1045-46 (7th Cir. 2018) (examining “the Spectacular as performed in 
2015 under each of the Court’s approaches.”). 
146 Id.  
 147 Eric Rassbach, Town of Greece v. Galloway: The Establishment Clause and 
the Rediscovery of History, 2014 CATO S. CT. REV. 71, 78 (2013-2014) (explaining 
that “the process of historical examination that Town of Greece has set in motion 
will continue to reshape how these cases are decided for years to come.”). 
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use the historical approach. Town of Greece was decided in 2014, 
making it one of the most recent Supreme Court cases examining the 
First Amendment’s Establishment Clause.148 There are various reasons 
why the Seventh Circuit may not have used the Town of Greece 
historical approach. Nevertheless, the court should have applied the 
most recent Supreme Court precedent, especially since Town of 
Greece marked a strong departure from previous cases.  
If one looks closely at the Concord opinion, the Seventh Circuit 
used the word “history” on multiple occasions, potentially for the 
purpose of superficially following Town of Greece.149 Looking to the 
first paragraph of the opinion, Chief Judge Wood noted the history of 
Christmas.150 She stated “[s]ince ancient times, people have been 
celebrating the winter solstice.”151 Further, students have performed 
the “Christmas Spectacular,” the holiday show at issue, for decades.152 
The only significant time the court mentioned Town of Greece was in 
a footnote concerning the validity of the endorsement test.153 The 
Seventh Circuit noted that Town of Greece did not make it explicit 
whether the endorsement test should still be used.154 But, a dissent in 
Trinity v. Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer “suggested that the 
endorsement test is still with us.”155 Semi-acknowledging the 
historical method is not enough, the Seventh Circuit unmistakably 
refrained from using the historical method.  
It is unclear from the Concord opinion exactly why the Seventh 
Circuit failed to use the historical method in Town of Greece. One 
reason could be that court thought the holiday show at issue was not a 
                                                 
148 134 S.Ct. 1811 (2014).  
 149 Concord, 885 F.3d at 1048 (explaining that a “reasonable observer is aware 
of a situation’s history and context and encompasses the views of adherents and non-
adherents alike.”). 
150 Id. at 1040-41. 
151 Id.   
152 Id. at 1041.  
153 Id. at 1045, n. 1.  
154 Id.  
 155 Id. (citing Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S.Ct. 
2012, 2031 n.4 (2017)).  
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“historical” practice per se, unlike the custom of beginning legislative 
sessions with prayer. The show in Concord had a lot of moving parts, 
including a nativity scene, Bible readings, and Christmas songs. There 
was not one historical practice for the court to analyze. However, the 
court could have looked to the history of Christmas and celebrating 
holidays in the public sphere. For instance, Christmas is a national 
holiday where the whole country takes the day off, and the Seventh 
Circuit referred to it as a secular event.  
The Town of Greece decision mandates courts to look to history 
when analyzing whether a violation of the Establishment Clause has 
occurred. Was the Seventh Circuit’s brief mentioning of the history of 
the winter solstice and the decades old holiday show enough to satisfy 
Town of Greece’s historical requirement? Likely not. The Christmas 
Spectacular in Concord may not perfectly be a “historical practice,” 
such as opening a legislative session with a prayer.156 This does not 
offer the Seventh Circuit an excuse to ignore recent Supreme Court 
precedent. At the very least, the Seventh Circuit should have 
acknowledged the historical approach explained why the court was not 
using it.  
 
D. Why the Seventh Circuit Should (and Must) Employ the Historical 
Approach 
 
As a preliminary matter, it is important to recognize that the 
Supreme Court’s language surrounding the historical approach in 
Town of Greece is mandatory.157 The Court was clear that the 
Establishment Clause must be interpreted according to historical 
practices and understandings.158 Further, the Supreme Court 
emphasized that the historical approach is not limited to any particular 
factual context.159 Therefore, any Establishment Clause case that does 
not use a historical approach violates the Supreme Court’s rule.  
                                                 
156 Town of Greece, 572 U.S. 565 (2014) 
157 Id. at 566. 
158 Id.  
159 Id. at 566-67.  
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The historical approach can help re-establish the Establishment 
Clause. The historical approach is not without its critics, and certainly 
is not a perfect test. The concurrence in Town of Greece noted that 
“history alone cannot carry the day,” suggesting that the historical 
approach should be combined with other Establishment Clause 
tests.160 But, the benefit of using the historical method in Town of 
Greece, in addition to other Establishment Clause tests, outweighs the 
consistent problems with the Lemon test. History can serve as a source 
of information and authority in Establishment Clause cases. 
Looking to the use of history generally in American law, our 
system is a precedent-based system and the Constitution, a 231-year-
old document, is the root of the Establishment Clause. The history of a 
practice can offer objectivity and authority.161 Using a historical 
method can also support the idea that some aspects of religion in 
government are acceptable. To some extent, it is impossible to remove 
all religion from politics. Further, a historical approach offers an 
external constraint on judicial subjectivity. As Erwin Chemerinsky 
stated, judges “want very much to make it appear that their decisions 
are not based on their personal opinions, but instead are derived from 
an external source.”162 
Other jurisprudence surrounding constitutional amendments 
demonstrates the trend that the Court looks to history in evaluating 
constitutionality of practices. As the Court noted in United States v. 
Jones, to analyze the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the Court 
must “assur[e] preservation of that degree of privacy against 
government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was 
adopted.”163 In evaluating the scope of the Sixth Amendment, the 
                                                 
160 Id.  
 161 See H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 660 
(1987); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 864 
(1989). 
 162 Erwin Chemerinsky, History, Tradition, the Supreme Court, and the First 
Amendment, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 901, 908 (1993).  
163 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012) (analyzing whether attaching a GPS tracking 
device to a vehicle and monitoring the vehicles movement was a search in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment) (quoting Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)).  
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Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey looked to “the practice of criminal 
indictment, trial by jury, and judgment by court as it existed during the 
years surrounding our Nation’s founding.”164 In the landmark Second 
Amendment case District of Columbia v. Heller, both the majority and 
the dissent of the Court used a historical approach in their opinions. 
Justice Scalia looked to “the history that the founding generation 
knew” when interpreting the meaning of the Second Amendment.165 
This trend towards reliance on the Bill of Rights’ history demonstrates 
that analysis on history is defined by what the Framers thought. 
Because the Court uses history in evaluating other constitutional 
amendments, it follows that the Court should do the same in analyzing 
the Establishment Clause. 
But on the other hand, history cannot resolve all problems. New 
practices may not have a specific history for a court to analyze. For 
instance, the Sixth Circuit in Smith v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Sch. 
Comm’rs recognized that in the case at hand, the “pure historical 
approach” was “of limited utility.”166 There are problems that the 
Framer’s might not have anticipated167 and historical practices may do 
little to enlighten courts. As the Supreme Court noted, “an awareness 
of history and an appreciation of the aims of the Founding Fathers do 
not always resolve concrete problems.”168 The problem with relying 
on history is that the times change, and so should our outlook on 
governmental practices. Courts should not use history as a tool to 
                                                 
164 530 U.S. 466, 478 (2000).  
 165 554 U.S. 570, 598 (2008). In his dissent, Justice Stevens analyzed the 
“contemporary concerns that animated the Framers.” Id. at 642.  
166 788 F.3d 580, 588 (6th Cir. 2015) (stating that [i]n cases like this one that 
cannot be resolved by resorting to historical practices, we do not believe that Town 
of Greece requires us to depart from our pre-existing jurisprudence.”).  
167 Id. (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 80 (1985) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in the judgment)).  
168 Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 234 (1963) 
(Brennan, J., concurring).  
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legitimate governmental practices that are no longer acceptable and 
would violate the Establishment Clause.169  
But, the two-step test set forth in Town of Greece inherently takes 
this problem into account. If history cannot resolve the question, then 
courts may look to the endorsement, coercion, and purpose tests. The 
Supreme Court in Town of Greece overtly gave greater weight to 
history by mandating it be analyzed in Establishment Clause cases, 
and therefore courts must look to history.170 The language in Town of 
Greece directs lower courts to examine the history of a practice when 
evaluating whether there has been a violation of the Establishment 
Clause. If history can demonstrate that a practice is well-settled in 
American history, no further test is necessary. But if history cannot 
resolve the issue, then courts may turn to the other Establishment 




Because Town of Greece did not explicitly overrule any of the 
previous Establishment Clause tests, they are still fair game for lower 
courts to cherry pick which one to use. What the Supreme Court has 
made clear is that history must be taken into account in Establishment 
Clause cases. When the Seventh Circuit decided Concord, it should 
have recognized the historical approach in Town of Greece and 
analyzed the history of the practice in regard to the Establishment 
                                                 
169 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 603 (1989) (“However 
history may affect the constitutionality of nonsectarian references to religion by the 
government, history cannot legitimate practices that demonstrate the government's 
allegiance to a particular sect or creed .... The legislative prayers involved 
in Marsh did not violate this principle because the particular chaplain had ‘removed 
all references to Christ.’”). 
170 See Paul Horwitz, The Religious Geography of Town of Greece v. 
Galloway, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 243, 246 (2014); Eric Rassbach, Town of Greece v 
Galloway: The Establishment Clause and the Rediscovery of History, 2014 CATO S. 
CT. REV. 71, 71 (2013-14) (explaining that Town of Greece’s historical approach 
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Clause. By declining to do so, the court failed to follow Supreme 
Court precedent that prescribes courts to look to history in 
Establishment Clause cases. In the future, the Seventh Circuit must at 
the very least acknowledge the historical approach explained in Town 
of Greece, and if applicable, engage in a dialogue about whether a 
historical practice comports with the Establishment Clause. 
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